Virtues and Animals Essay questions UnderstandingDemonstrate understanding without explicitly listing the guiding questions (i.e. write in essay format). J | Homework Answers
Virtues and Animals Essay questions UnderstandingDemonstrate understanding without explicitly listing the guiding questions (i.e. write in essay format). J Agric Environ Ethics (2014) 27:909929
DOI 10.1007/s10806-014-9505-z
ARTICLES
Virtues and Animals: A Minimally Decent Ethic
for Practical Living in a Non-ideal World
Cheryl Abbate
Accepted: 24 April 2014 / Published online: 6 May 2014
! Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014
Abstract Traditional approaches to animal ethics commonly emerge from one of
two influential ethical theories: Regans deontology (The case for animal rights.
University of California, Berkeley, 1983) and Singers preference utilitarianism
(Animal liberation. Avon Books, New York, 1975). I argue that both of the theories
are unsuccessful at providing adequate protection for animals because they are
unable to satisfy the three conditions of a minimally decent theory of animal protection. While Singers theory is overly permissive, Regans theory is too restrictive.
I argue that a minimally decent animal ethic requires a framework that allows for
context-dependent considerations of our complex humananimal relationship in a
non-ideal world. A plausible theory which exemplifies this new ethic is virtue
ethics.
Keywords
Philosophy ! Animal ethics ! Virtue ethics
Traditional approaches to animal ethics commonly emerge from one of two
influential ethical theories: Tom Regans deontology (1983) or Peter Singers
preference utilitarianism (1975).1 While both theories are often rejected because
they are committed to consequences that are undesirable for humans (Cohen 1986,
2001; Schmahmann and Polacheck 1995), I argue that both theories should be
rejected because they are unsuccessful at providing adequate protection for
1
See Singers (1975) Animal Liberation and Regans (1983) The Case for Animal Rights, which are
considered to be the two most influential works on animal liberation.
C. Abbate (&)
Marquette University, 912 N 76th Street, Wauwatosa, WI 53213, USA
e-mail: Cheryl.abbate@marquette.edu
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animals.2 This is because both fail to satisfy at least one of the following three
conditions which I argue a minimally decent theory of animal protection must
embrace3:
1.
2.
3.
It must condemn practices and industries which cause unnecessary animal
suffering and death,
It must provide normative guidance for individual moral agents that forbids
them from being a party to practices and industries that cause unnecessary
suffering and death to animals, and
It must provide normative guidance that instructs moral agents to prevent moral
catastrophes by at least minimizing or reducing the pain, suffering, and death of
nonhuman animals if elimination of pain, suffering, and death is not feasible.
The permissive nature of Singers preference utilitarianism prevents his theory
from satisfying the first two conditions because: (1) his theory is unable to condemn
certain industries and practices that cause unnecessary suffering to animals, and (2)
his account is unable to demand that individuals refuse to be a party to certain
industries or practices that generate a significant amount of unnecessary animal
suffering. On the other hand, the restrictiveness of Regans theory is at odds with the
third condition: his account permits moral catastrophes which would generate
unfathomable animal suffering and death.
The deficiencies of both utilitarianism and deontology stem from their
assumption that there is one universal moral principle or rule that should govern
all conceivable situations involving animals, regardless of the imperfect conditions
of our world that impact our encounters with animals. Since rule moralities, like
utilitarianism and deontology, cannot account for the complexity of humananimal
interactions, I argue that a minimally decent animal liberation ethics requires a
framework that allows for context-dependent considerations of our complex
humananimal relationships in a non-ideal world. A plausible theory which
exemplifies such a framework is virtue ethics.
A Minimal Decent Ethic for Animal Ethicists
Before proceeding, it is important to note that my target audience, individuals who
desire to liberate and protect animals from human supremacy, are already
committed to a concern for animals. The goal of this project, then, is not to
convince utilitarians or deontologists to accept a theory of virtue ethics nor is the
aim of this paper to convince moral agents to foster an interest in animal ethics if
they are presently unconcerned. Rather, the intent of my project is to address those
who already foster a concern for the welfare and lives of animals and to provide
them with reasons to ground these concerns in a theory of virtue ethics, which I
argue, can best account for their basic intuitions.
2
For the sake of simplicity, I will often use the term animal to refer to nonhuman animals in this paper
3
This idea of building an animal ethics around common sense principles is also found in Engel
(2001), Sapontzis (1987), DeGrazia (1996) and Clark (1977)
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Keeping in mind the goal of this project, there are four implicit assumptions
which, I argue, give rise to and make sense of the three previously mentioned
conditions of a minimally decent theory of animal protection. These assumptions
are generally agreed upon by animal advocates and thus they will motivate the
discussion which follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
Causing unnecessary pain to animals is wrong.
Killing animals without good reason is wrong.
It is wrong to participate in activities that cause, or are made possible by,
unnecessary animal suffering and death.
There will be times when it is necessary to kill an animal, or to cause it some
amount of suffering, such as in order to prevent a greater amount of animal
suffering and death.
I furthermore acknowledge that there is not widespread agreement about some of
these claims in the ethical theory community at large. For instance, a utilitarian
might question whether it is wrong to kill an animal if it is done painlessly. A
utilitarian might also be skeptical of the claim that it is wrong to be a party to a
practice that causes, or is made possible by, unnecessary animal suffering if ones
presence itself does not cause suffering. I set aside these theoretical considerations
and proceed with the assumption that these four claims should not be disregarded
when evaluating possible ethical frameworks for an animal ethic because there is
widespread agreement about these claims in the animal liberation community.
Claim #1: It is Wrong to Cause Animals to Suffer Unnecessarily
The first condition of a minimally decent theory of animal protection is derived
from a basic principle of nonmaleficence that, at the very least, every minimally
decent theory of animal ethics should accept: nonhuman animal suffering and pain
is bad and unnecessary suffering ought not to be imposed on them (DeGrazia 2005;
Clark 1977). At first glance, this principle of nonmaleficence may appear utilitarian
in nature, yet as most animal ethicists would agree, a disdain for unnecessary
suffering is not unique to utilitarianism: all minimally decent moral theories agree
that beings who can suffer, including nonhuman animals, should not be subjected to
unnecessary pain or suffering (see Clark 1977; DeGrazia 2005; Francione 1995;
Engel 2000). As DeGrazia points out, this is one moral principle that is beyond
serious doubt and one need not appeal to a specific moral theory in order to accept
this principle. According to DeGrazia (1996, 259), a system of thought that did not
embrace nonmaleficence would hardly be recognizable as a moral system. Thus, at
the very least, a decent animal ethic should endorse the claim that the unnecessary
pain and suffering of animals ought to be prevented and an ethic that does not
succeed in preventing unnecessary harms to nonhuman animals is a deficient
foundation for an animal protection ethic.
A fundamental consideration within this discussion concerns what constitutes
unnecessary or needless suffering. To say that X is necessary is to say that one must
X in order to get Y, and there are no other ways to get Y without Xing. Yet to say
that something is necessary does not settle the moral question: it might be
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necessary to do A in order to achieve a certain outcome B, while at the same
time, it might be morally impermissible to do A because it causes suffering in order
to achieve B, when B itself is not itself necessary. For instance the suffering that
infants would endure through infant torture is necessary if you want to study the
effects of torture on infants, but that doesnt entail that the suffering of the infants is
a moral necessity. 4Likewise, the suffering that animals endure is indeed necessary
for the majority of practices that involve the use of nonhuman animals, such as
factory farming, the circus, zoos, hunting, pigeon shoots, rodeos, and so forth, yet it
does not follow that the suffering of animals is of a moral necessity. In both cases of
infant-torture and animal exploitation, the necessary suffering is only causally
necessary: the infant suffering and animal suffering is necessary given the nature of
the activity. However, the activity itself (such as torture, rodeos, and so forth) is not
necessary in a moral sense; it is not necessary to bring about a significant good.5
For the remainder of this discussion, I will assume that the phrase necessary
suffering refers to only suffering that is of a moral necessity. I will argue that in
order for animal suffering to be characterized as morally necessary, it must meet
two conditions:
1.
2.
The suffering caused to animals must be caused in the name of some end that is
worth the cost, or proportional to, the suffering involved. As Clark (1977,
4245) writes, the human ends within which we calculate necessity must be of
some weight.
The activity or practice which is responsible for causing animal suffering must
itself be necessary for achieving some greater good. That is, there must be no
other way to achieve the good end other than performing the activity or practice
that causes the suffering.
To make this clear, consider the following two scenarios:
Scenario 1: In order to test the safety of a new makeup product, researchers
subject a rabbit to excruciating pain through a toxicity test known as the Draize
test. During this test, large quantities of the makeup product is forced into the eye
of a rabbit, after which the rabbit might experience redness, swelling, discharge,
ulceration, hemorrhaging, or even blindness in her tested eye.
Scenario 2: Farm animals are forced to suffer in intensive, confining, restrictive, and
unsanitary conditions so that they can be mass produced for human consumption.
In the first scenario, the suffering caused to the rabbit is not in the name of a
significant end that is worth the cost of the immense suffering that a rabbit endures
4
Thank you to Nathan Nobis who enlightened this discussion and provided this example in personal
conversation.
5
Although one might point out that going to rodeos, circuses, and so forth brings about an important
human good, such as pleasure or entertainment, the suffering of these animals still is not necessary
because we could achieve similar pleasure or entertainment through some other activity, like going to a
comedy show, watching a movie, and so forth. Since we have these other sources of entertainment, rodeos
are not necessary for entertainment; it is just one, among many, opportunities for entertainment. Also note
that there might be different conceptions of what counts as a significant good depending on ones cultural
values. While I am sympathetic to this point, I will assume that there are at least a few obvious goods
that are not significant, irrespective of ones culture (such as gustatory pleasure or entertainment).
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in the Draize Eye test. Rather, the suffering is inflicted upon the rabbit for a trivial
reason: vanity. This would be the sort of suffering that Engel classifies as suffering
that serves no greater, outweighing justifying good (2000, 859). Undoubtedly, the
suffering caused to the rabbit in this scenario is not of a moral necessity because it
fails to pass the first requirement.
In the second scenario, the suffering of the farm animals is caused for a more
substantial purpose: human nutrition. However, the suffering of the animals still is
not of a moral necessity because there are non-animal alternatives readily available
(especially in developed nations) that sufficiently meet the nutritional needs of
humans, such as plant based foods. Thus, even though the end that is sought after is
significantly important, the activity or practice that causes the suffering of animals is
not necessary to achieve that end. Since we have other means of meeting the
nutritional needs of humans, factory farming cannot be said to be necessary for
providing nutrition to humans; it is just one, among many, possible ways of meeting
the nutritional needs of humans.
Claim #2: It is Wrong to Kill Animals Unnecessarily
A minimally decent animal ethic, to some extent, is also concerned with preventing
the unnecessary death of animals. While some self-proclaimed animal ethicists,
such as Cigman (1980, 57), McMahan (2008, 6676), Hare (1993, 226) and Singer
(2011, 104) maintain that death is not a harm for animals since they do not have a
desire to continue to live, the killing of animals still is not considered to be
inconsequential. For instance, Singer points out that many modes of killing used
on animals do not inflict instantaneous death, so there is pain in the process of
dying (Singer 2011, 104). Furthermore, even a utilitarian finds it morally
problematic to kill an animal painlessly without good reason because when animals
die, there is usually a loss of good experiences in the world. Through death, animals
are deprived of the pleasure of their existence and since a utilitarian finds a world in
which beings are deprived of pleasurable experiences to be morally undesirable,
moral agents ought not kill animals without good reason (Singer 2011, 120).
But more importantly, as Singer writes, to effectively liberate animals, we must
bring nonhuman animals within our sphere of moral concern and cease to treat
their lives as expendable for whatever trivial purposes we may have (Singer 1975,
20). To kill animals needlessly, however painless their deaths might be, is to
undermine the goal of all animal liberationists. To dispose of animals when we feel
like it or when they become bothersome, however painless their death, is to send
the message that the lives of all animals are insignificant, meaningless, unimportant,
and inferior to the lives of all humans.
The animal ethicists aversion to painlessly killing animals is evident when we
consider her response to the phenomena of overpopulation of homeless cats and
dogs. She does not find it acceptable to just painlessly kill these animals to quickly
and ethically resolve the issue. Rather, as someone who cares about these
animals, she struggles to find these animals a home. She feels an enormous sense of
regret and sadness when she is presented with the statistics regarding the millions of
healthy cats and dogs who are painlessly killed each year in animal shelters. She is
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troubled each time she learns that a healthy cat has been painlessly killed because
she believes that it is undesirable for the cat to be denied the opportunity to live the
life he was given.
Claim #3: It is Wrong to be a Party to Animal Cruelty
My third assumption is that animal ethicists agree that it is wrong for one to be a
party to acts or practices that cause, or are made possible by, unnecessary animal
suffering even if her participation in these acts does not, in any way, cause animals
to suffer. For instance, someone who claims to care about the well-being of animals
would not accept a free ticket to a dog fighting show while reassuring herself that
the ticket would have just gone to waste. Someone who is concerned for animal
welfare would not devour kitty soup that was produced by torturing cats even if
the soup would go to waste if she refused to eat it. Someone who is truly concerned
for the well-being of animals would feel revulsion at the prospect of participating in
such activities and would thus refuse to be a part of these activities even if her
participation does not, in any way, cause animals to suffer.
Claim #4: It is Acceptable to Harm Animals in Order to Prevent a Moral
Catastrophe
While we can point to a number of exploitative practices, like factory farming and
cosmetic testing, that cause animals to suffer unnecessarily, there might be times when
it is morally necessary to: (1) inflict some amount of pain upon a number of animals,
and (2) painlessly kill some number of animals. That is, there are instances where
causing harm to a being is necessary to secure some end which is worth the cost, or
proportional to, the suffering or death involved. One case of necessary suffering and
death which I am concerned with in this paper concerns moral catastrophes: situations
where the only way a moral agent can prevent the uncontrolled, continuation of
significant animal suffering and death is by causing harm to some smaller number of
animals. Since animals are: (1) unable to escape their suffering, and (2) unable,
themselves, to take measures to control widespread animal suffering, humans, then,
are the only beings in a position to intervene in some way. If the only way to minimize
an epidemic of animal suffering and death is for human beings to either painlessly kill
some animals or cause animals some degree of bearable suffering, then a moral agent
should intervene and act to minimize this suffering, while lamenting the harm she
causes. If she does nothing, then she sentences a significant amount of animals to a life
of misery: misery that could have been prevented had she intervened. In such
exceptional cases, causing nonhuman animals harm, according to the definition of
necessity deployed in this paper, is morally necessary.
Utilitarianism: An Excessively Permissive Theory
Singers preference utilitarianism, as presented in Animal Liberation (1975), is the
dominant utilitarian approach used to promote an ethic for nonhuman animals. The
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fundamental goal of Singers project is to extend the basic principle of equality to
animals. This principle requires moral agents to give everyones interests equal
consideration. Since sentient animals have interests, such as the interest in not
suffering, we must take their interests into account and give equal consideration to
their suffering as we would to the suffering of humans. That is, we should not
discount the suffering of an elephant in moral decision making simply because she
is just an animal.
Singer argues that taking serious the principle of equal consideration does not
require us to protect the interests of beings (human or nonhuman) with
nonviolable rights; rather, the goal of the basic principle of equality is to ensure
that, in moral decision making, we give equal weight to the interests of all
sentient beings and that we do not arbitrarily discriminate against animals based
on their species membership (Singer 1975, 34). Since Singer is a preference
utilitarian, he operates under the assumption that the ultimate goal of morality is
not to protect the interests of beings with rights, but rather, he assumes that the
goal of morality is to maximize preferences (also referred to as interests) of all
sentient beings.
If the ultimate goal of morality is to maximize preferences, then it follows that
any beings preference can be overridden if the conseq…
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